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In the St1prei11e Cottrt of the
State of Utah

EDWARD STEVENS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

CASE
NO. 7781

FEARN GRAY,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Counsel for respondent is unable to agree with the statement of the case contained in appellant's brief.
Said statement contains considerable argument which
is again repeated in appellant's argument which resulted
in much unnecessary repetition.
Counsel has advised this Court often in his brief of the
elapsed time between the case being submitted and the
Court's decision. The Court will take notice of the record
and minutes contained therein; hence, we will discuss the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

matter no further, except to call the Court's attention to
the fact that the term of the Trial Judge expired in January, 1949, and cormsel stipulated that the Judge might decide the case subsequent to his leaving office (R. 105).
Not only do we disagree with many statements of counsel in his statement of the case, but we hesitate to pass unnoticed counsel's argument of the matter in his statement
of the case.
We wish to observe in answer to the statement of the
appellant's counsel on page 3 of his brief that the elapsed
time between the submission of this case and the memorandum decision apparently resulted in much more confusion
of the rna tter to counsel than to the Trial Court.
On page 3 counsel launches into a heated argument
with respect to the appellant's claimed credit of $215.00,
and his contention that respondent admitted that he received $77,145.49 instead of the $76,145.49 with which he
was charged by the Court.
Both the respondent and the Court agree with appellant's statement at the bottom of page 4. No question was
ever raised as to the purchase of five hundred twenty-five
(525) head of cattle by appellant, or as to the expenditure
of $26,303.47 for same.
As to appellant's statement on page 5 of his brief, it
is observed that appellant claims total advances in the
amount of $38,086.14. May we call the Court's attention to.
the fact that the Trial Court awarded appellant $38,294.49,
or $203.42 more than appellant claimed (R. 50).
On pages 5 and 6 of his brief counsel sets up a straw
man and then attempts to knock it over. He discusses the
$4300.00 note and the payment of the same; that defendant admitted the payment by plaintiff of $3300.00, and al-
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leged payment by defendant of $1,000.00. Appellant produced the bank cashier, and after some preliminary questions it was stipulated that Mr. Dixon, the cashier, would
testify that defendant paid $1,000.00 on the note March
18, 1941, and that Stevens paid the balance (Tr. 81).
It is to be observed that the respondent testified that
he did not pay the $1,000.00 on the note. It will be observed
that defendant testified that he went into the bank and
paid Mr. Dixon. Apparently the balance of defendant's answer was not noted by the reporter, and dashes are inserted
after the word Dixon (Tr. 423).
We submit that in face of the pleading and the stipulation that there is no occasion for argument on that matter. In the course of our argument we will explain our position and call the Court's attention to plaintiff's reply to
amended counterclaim wherein that credit is recognized
(R. 64).
Counsel further confuses the issue by stating at the
bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7 of appellant's brief
that defendant stipulated that the $1,000.00 overpayment
was paid to defendant, and that he should be charged with
the same. There is no dispute upon the question of the
overpayment to defendant by Cudahy Packing Co., defendant has admitted and fully accounted for the same in his
pleadings, which is evidenced by the admission in evidence
of Exhibit "U", which admission was moved by defendant's
counsel (Tr. 623).

On page 9 of appellant's brief it is admitted that defendant purchased eight hundred eighty (880) head of
cattle, which number plaintiff admits, but alleges that he
does not know for whom some of the cattle were purchased.
Plaintiff raises objection, however, to the fact that he did not
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participate in the purchase of some of said cattle. There
is no question from the record, however, that the cattle
were all purchased for the partnership.
On page 11 of appellant's brief it is conceded that defendant purchased eight hundred eighty (880) head of
cattle, and paid for said cattle $47,243.66. The Court allowed defendant that exact amount (R. 80).
Appellant in his brief, on the bottom of page 11 and
top of page 12, alleges that there is no controversy as to
the claim for credit set out in B of paragraph 8 of defendant's amended counterclaim, except the item of $4.08 and
the claim for interest. The Court's attention is called to
the fact that counsel for appellant inadvertently refers to
B in paragraph 8 instead of A in paragraph 8 (R. 42). The
total amount claimed by defendant under A, paragraph 8 of
his amended counterclaim (R. 42) is $4,350.73; appellant'
objects to the item of $4.08 and admits that defendant is
entitled to the balance of $4,346.65.
Appellant admits on page 12 of his brief all credits
claimed by defendant under B of paragraph 8 of his amended counterclaim in the amount of $2,849.45.
By the time counsel reached page 13 of his brief he
forgot what he had said on pages 1 and 2 of his brief as
to the filing of amended pleadings to conform to the proof,
and observes that defendant in his original counterclaim
alleges that he was entitled to be paid thirty-five cents a
day per animal for feeding the partnership cattle, and that
he later claimed in his amended counterclaim an allowance
of thirty- six and a half cents per day.
The next seven pages of counsel's brief and down to
the middle of page 21 of his statement of the case is devoted to a discussion of the testimony of the various wit-
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nesses with respect to feeding of cattle. We cannot agree
that counsel's statement of the testimony is correct, or that
all of the testimony with respect to the matter has been included in counsel's statement.
We shall not attempt to analyze the testimony of the
various witnesses referred to from pages 13 to 21, but will
discuss the testimony in our argument in the case.

,.

On pages 21 and 22 of counsel's brief he discusses defendant's use of his personal automobile with respect to
the partnership business; and observes at page 22, "The
evidence will not support a finding that defendant drove
his automobile on partnership business to exceed 15,000
miles." Counsel then observes, "We do not know what the
Trial Court found as to mileage or cost per mile, but if he
found the cost of operating an automobile was seven cents
per mile, such finding would find support in the evidence."
Defendant claimed credit for the use of his personal automobile in the amount of $1,000 (R. 48, par. 12). We believe
the evidence supports the contention of defendant that he
drove his automobile for the business of the partnership in
excess of 20,000 miles. We are constrained to call the
Court's attention to the fact that in addition to the trips
referred to by plaintiff in his brief on pages 21 and 22, the
evidence discloses that many trips were made by defendant from Payson to Salt Lake City and Ogden. That many
trips were made to Dog Valley and Sage Valley; that trips
were made to Richfield, Minersville, Heber City, Fairfield,
Nephi, Delta, Fillmore, Milford and Spanish Fork. If defendant were allowed credit at seven cents per mile on
15,000 miles, as conceded by plaintiff's counsel on page 22
of his brief, it would amount to $50.00 more than defendant
has asked for the use of his personal automobile.
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For counsel's information we wish to advise him and
the Court that defendant was not allowed credit for the
use of his automobile on partnership business for the 15,000
miles which plaintiff suggests was the miles traveled. In
fact, no allowance was made, whatsoever to the defendant
for the use of his automobile. An examination of paragraph 5 of the Court's findings of facts (R. 80 and 81) discloses that no credit whatsoever was given for the use of
defendant's automobile claimed by defendant in paragraph
12 of his amended counterclaim (R. 48).
We have already advised the Court and counsel of our
intention to rely for affirmative relief upon the Court's
failure to allow $1,000.00 for the use of defendant's personal automobile.
We have likewise .advised the Court and counsel that
we claim $1,701.23 which the Court failed to allow as interest paid by defendant in excess of any interest paid by
appellant.
We have likewise advised the Court and counsel that
we claimed $1,542.56, the reasonable value of thirty-one
(31) head of Minersville cattle purchased by plaintiff in
1936, and not accounted for by plaintiff.
POINTS TO BE COVERED IN DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENT

Respondent in his
the following points:

argume~t

will discuss his case under

POINT ONE
The Trial Court committed no error in receiving testimony as to the reasonable value of feeding cattle.
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POINT TWO
The Trial Court committed no error in making its finding No. 5 (R. 80) and in allowing defendant credit for the
items mentioned in Point Four of plaintiff's assignment of
errors.
POINT THREE
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to give
plaintiff credit for the sum of $215.00 for feeding fortythree (43) head of cattle during the winter 1946-1947 (19361937) mentioned in Point Two of plaintiff's assignment of
errors.
POINT FOUR
The Trial Court committed no error in making its finding No. 5 (R. 80) and in allowing defendant credit for the
items mentioned in Point Three of plaintiff's assignment
of errors.
POINT FIVE
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to find
that defendant received for his own use the sum of $77,145.49 from the sale of partnership cattle mentioned in Point
Five of plaintiff's assignment of errors.
POINT SIX
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to find
that defendant received for his own use the amounts mentioned in Point Six of plaintiff's assignment of errors.
POINT SEVEN
The Trial Court committed no error in failing to charge
defendant with at least thirty-one (31) head of partnership
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cattle mentioned· in Point Seven of plaintiff's assignment
of errors.
POINT EIGHT
The Trial Court's failure to allow defendant $1,000.00
for the use of defendant's personal automomile in transacting partnership business.
POINT NINE
The Trial Court's failure to allow defendant $1,701.23,
being the amount paid by defendant as interest in excess
of the amount of interest paid by plaintiff.
POINT TEN
The Trial Court's failure to allow defendant the sum of
$1,542.56, the reasonable value of thirty-one (31) head of
Minersville cattle purchased by plaintiff for the partnership
in 1936, and not accounted for by plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'ITED NO ERROR IN
RECEIVING TESTIMONY AS TO THE REJASON:ABLE
VALUE OF FEEDING CATTLE.
Counsel, in his brief ((PP. 25-30) discusses what he
denotes Elementary Principles of Law with respect to the
duties and obligations of one partner to his co-partner.
We have adopted the uniform partnership law and,
of course, the analogy of what is required by a guardian,
executor and administrator in his relationship with his. ward,
testator or decedent under our probate code, is quite foreign
to the subject in hand.
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The guardian is transacting business for either a minor
or incompetent 'person, either of whom are presumed to be
unable to sense or understand what is being done by the
representative. As to the executor and administrator, they
stand in a representative capacity for a decedent. No such
relationship exists as to partners.
In paragraph 2 of plaintiff's amended complaint it is
alleged, among other things, that plaintiff and defendant
agreed to engage in the business of buying, feeding and selling cattle, particularly steers, to be fed and sold for beef.
Counsel presents to the Court a two-horned dilemma;
he suggests that he is willing to concede that defendant is
entitled to 25c a day per head for feeding steers on the Gray
ranch (R. 60), then he argues that unless the Court accepts his proposition of 25c per head per day that every expense must be minutely itemized in order for the Court to
make an allowance for the same (PP. 46-47) appellant's
brief.
May we observe at the outset that it may be reasonably inferred that Stevens at all times knew the basis upon
which Gray was undertaking to feed the cattle. Stevens
did know that the cattle were being fed hay and grain raised
by Mr. Gray, on the 600-acre ranch leased by him (Tr. 160).
Gray also fed barley, corn, bran and cotton-seed meal. Stevens cannot claim ignorance ten years after the feeding
was done, and then demand of Gray that he furnish itemized accounts of the costs of feeding which occurred at a
time when he knew of the expenses for feeding.
It is admitted that no agreement as to the charge of
feeding cattle by Gray was ever made (Tr. 22); nor is there
any indication from his testimony that he had any understanding with Gray as to a rate of 25c per day per head;
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nor does the testimony disclose any implied understanding
that the feeding would cost less than the reasonable cost of
the materials, hay, grain, cotton-seed meal, bran plus labor
and use of wagons and teams.
No charge has been made for the personal services of
the defendant, but only the reasonable cost of the materials,
men, teams and wagons employed in feeding the partnership cattle.
We have no quarrel with counsel as to the language
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of
"Nelson v. Matsch," 38 U. 122, 110 Pac. 865, and quoted by
counsel on pages 25 and 26 of his brief. We subscribe fully
to the language there used:
"Partners stand in a fiduciary relation to each other, and each must use the utmost good faith toward his
associates in all partnership business, and, where one
partner by false representations obtains an undue advantage over another in a partnership transaction,
equity will grant the defrauded party relief."
There is no question of Gray's good faith. No undue
advantage was ever obtained by Gray through false representations measured by any equitable standard. Testimony
most certainly discloses that Stevens and not Gray was the
man who obtained money for nothing, or something more
than his contribution to the partnership. Gray is not asking any compensation for personal services for his personal
supervision of the cattle at Sage Vialley after he was notified that unless they were taken care of the partnership
would lose the cattle. It was Gray, and not Stevens, who
plowed through the January snow from Nephi to Sage Valley. While Stevens warmed his toes in his own home, Gray
was out looking after the partnership business. Stevens
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testified that he frequently visited Gray's ranch in the winter of 1937 and 1938. The evidence is undisputed that he
never made a trip to Mosida. That the cattle were either
looked after by Mr. Gray or his son-in-law (Tr. 168).
Counsel quotes from 47 C. J., page 771-2.
May we observe that Stevens not only had a right to
know-presumably he did know all that could be known
concerning the partnership affairs.
Counsel has urged that the obligation to keep accurate
books and accounts was the sole obligation of Gray, and
cites 47 C. J. 785 in support of such proposition, but counsel
omitted to finish the sentence in his quotation. The balance of the sentence appearing in 47 C. J. 785, omitted from
plaintiff's brief on page 26, reads as follows
". . . . . unless where the business is run without
books with the knowledge and consent of the partners."
The record is devoid of any agreement or understanding that records showing the itemized expense of operating
the partnership were to be kept. Of course, the absurdity
of counsel's position is made manifest by his claim for wintering cattle in 1937 and 1938 at a fixed price per head, as
set out in paragraph 6 of plaintiff's amended complaint
(R. 32). If plaintiff expected any more bookkeeping than
that shown by defendant's counterclaim he certainly shows
a lack of goOd faith in waiting nine years, and then demanding that he be unjustly enriched because of the absence of
records which he at all times knew did not exist.
Counsel quotes Sections 69-1-16, 17 and 18, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. We believe that the sections lend little
comfort to counsel and are fully met by the evidence offered by defendant. Section 69-1-16 requires that the
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partnership books be kept at the principal place of business
of the partnership, and that every partner shall have access and may inspect and copy any of them. Where was
the principal place of business of this partnership? Was it
at Stevens' home, at Gray's home, at Stevens' ranch or at
Gray's ranch, at the Bank of Spanish Fork or the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork? There is no evidence that Stevens was ever denied a full opportunity to acquaint himself
with the manner in which the cattle were fed on Gray's
ranch. There is no intimation that Stevens was ever denied
the rights granted a partner under Section 69-1-17. Stevens has not testified or claimed that he ever demanded
any information concerning the partnership which was denied to him. RJather, it is presumed that whatever information he sought, he obtained. He has never complained,
either in testimony or pleadings, that Gray failed to furnish
him full and complete information. Hlis conduct is explained
not by his having been denied information, but by his disappointment because of losses, and he is setting up his lack
of interest as a basis to throw a larger share of the loss
upon Gray.
Section 69-1-18 requires a partner to account for any
benefit that he has received and to hold as a trustee any
profits derived by him, without the consent of the other
partners, from any transaction, etc.
There is no evidence whatsoever that Gray received
any personal benefit or any profits from any transaction
to which Stevens had not given his consent.
Counsel quotes from the case of Paggi v. Skliris, 54
Utah 88, 179 Pac. 739, to the effect that a partner will not
be permitted to take advantage of any secret agreement
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to receive a private or personal gain for the work on business carried on by a partnership.
We submit that the language quoted from that case in
no \\ise fits the situation under consideration, and we believe that counsel will find nothing in the law that will support his contention that Gray is not entitled to the reasonable value of the feed furnished the cattle, for the hired
help, and the reasonable value of teams and wagons. Gray
is not seeking to charge anything for his own services even
though in equity he should be paid for what Stevens failed
to do.
In Volume 1 of Rowley on Partnership, Section 354,
the author says:
''The rule that each partner must be assumed to
render his services in the partnership business gratuitously, is not inflexible nor of universal application. It
has its exceptions founded in wisdom and experience.
Where it can be fairly and justly implied from the
course of dealings between the partners, or from circumstances of equivalent force, that one partner is to
be compensated for his services, his claim will be sustained . . . . . Where one partner has full charge of
the business and others have acquiesced and devoted
their time to their own affairs, an agreement to compensa~ will be implied more readily than when all are
giving equal attention to the business."
It is our position, of course, that a partner owes absolute fidelity to his partner, but that rule certainly does not
go to the extent of permitting a partner who has given his
own time to his own business and thrown the burden of taking care of partnership property upon his partner, to reap
a further harvest in addition to his failure to do his share
of the partnership work, and deny compensation for ex-
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penditures made to portect the partnership property (and
this is most certainly true when the partner is fully aware
that such expenditures are being made.)
In Rowley's work on Partnership, Volume 1, Sections
389 to 400, the author sets out the general duties of a partner. Those are enumerated as follows:
1.

That he shall not secure a personal benefit rightly
belonging to the firm.

2.

That he shall not purchase claims against the partnership at a discount and collect in full.

3.

He shall not secretly obtain profits that the partnership is entitled to, such as inducing a partner
to sell his interest in valuable land, knowing the
nature of the property, and without advising the
partner of the known value.

4.

He may not speculate with or use partnership funds
to make a profit, (if a profit is made he must share
with his partner).

5.

He may not use his influence in securing a contract
for the partnership and accept additional personal
consideration for himself.

6.

A partner may not undercut the partnership by
renewing a lease in which the partnership is interested (in his own name) when good faith requires
its renewal in the name of the partnership, unless
the other partner agrees that it should not be renewed.

7.

A partner may not hold secret commissions obtained from a person dealing with the firm. If a
partner uses partnership money to buy property
and pays a certain amount, and in consideration
for the payment he receives a cutback, the partnership is entitled to an accounting on such cutback.
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If he sells for less than full value and gets a com-

mission for his services, he will be accountable for
the same.
8.

A partner may not conduct a business in competition, with a like business, of the partnership without the consent of the partners.

9.

A partner cannot acquire his partner's interest unless in good faith, and a partner aware of a valuable asset not known to his partner cannot acquire
his interest without disclosing the facts, nor can
he escape responsibility by misrepresenting the
value. If he talks down the partner's value in order to acquire his partner's interest and buys it
for less than it is worth, he must account for the
advantage thus obtained.

None of these principles are violated in the matter involved before the Court. Gray is not seeking a profit. He
is charging only for the reasonable value of the hay fed, the
grain and the cotton-seed meal, etc. He is not charging
more than the reasonable value for the use of his teams
and wagons, nor any more than the actual expense for the
man engaged in taking care of the partnership property.
Stevens and Gray lived in the same county and in the
same community (Payson, Utah) (Tr. 12 and Tr. 15). Stevens was in a position at all times to know what was being
done by Gray, and I think the Court would entirely ignore
the facts if it failed to conclude that Stevens actually knew
what was being done with respect to feeding the cattle. In
fact, Stevens took a major part in selling the cattle from
Gray's feed yard.
Plaintiff testified that 403 or 405 head of partnership
cattle were sold March 21, 1938. That plaintiff was there
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when they were sold, that they were sold in his name, and
they were contracted in his name (Tr. 24-25).
On cross-examination plaintiff testified that he did not
remember who he contacted for the sale of said cattle; that
he could not say where he made arrangements; with whom
he made the arrangements or whether the check was made
to plaintiff or defendant (Tr. 95).
Plaintiff further testified that he received the money
for the 403 or 405 head of cattle (Tr. 87 and 97).
The fiduciary relationship existing between partners
does not require that one partner shall furnish his own
property for the use of the partnership at less than its reasonable value.
In 47 C. J., Section 971, at page 1251, the author says:
"In stating the account each partner is to be credited with every contribution which he has made to the
partnership funds or property as shown by the books,
or other competent evidence."
Section 69-1-18, Utah Code (our partnership law) provides:
"Every partner must account to the partnership
for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him, without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from
any use by him of its property."
Defendant's ranch was not partnership property; defendant' hay was not property· of the partnership. Stevens
had invested nothing in the ranch nor the hay and grain.
No charge was made against the partnership for the use
of the ranch property.
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''All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or
otherllise on account of the partnership, is partnership
property." (Section 69-1-5, U. C. A. 1943).
If defendant had paid

361/~C

per day for feeding the
partnership stock the partnership would be bound. (Of
course, if it were shown that a partner paid out 361f2c per
day per head and obtained some refund or personal compensation or rebate back he would be required to account
to his partner for that).
Lundlay, in his work on Partnersip, at page 598, says:
"Each is entitled to be allowed as against the others, everything he has advanced or brought in as a partnership transaction, and to charge the other in the account with what the other has not brought in or has
taken out more than he ought."
In Vol. 2 of Rowley on the law of Partnership, Sec. 729,
P. 1011, under title "Charges & Credits", the author says:
''The firm is charged with what each partner has
contributed to it."
In Vol. 1, Rowley on Partnership, Sec. 364, P. 432, under
section title "Right to Contribution" says:
''It consists ordinarily of the right to be credited
on the taking of an account and the making of a settlement, with all property owned priva~ly and individually, that has been expended in the .carrying out of
any 1'irm undertaking."

In Vol1, Rowley on "Partnership," Sec. 398, P. 398-99,
says:

"A partner by being a member of a firm is not
hindered from dealing with it in good faith so long as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
the firm receives a fair consideration for its bargain
..... A partner to whom the firm is indebted for goods
sold may pay himself from partnership assets. A partner also engaged in a separate business, is entitled to a
fair market price for materials sold by him to the firm.
(The author cites "Curry v. Charles Warren Co." (Del.)
42 Atlantic 425.)

In the case of "Curry v. Charles Warren Co." (Del.}
42 Atlantic 426 (cited by Rowley P. 474 S. 398, the Sylabus
reads as follows; and explains the general facts:
("Where manufacturers of mortar were also engaged in the sale of sand, lime, etc., one who was associated with them in the mortar business alone and
who was entitled to a share of the profits th.ereo,f, was
entitled to have the same, etc. charged not at its cost,
but only as its fair market price.")

The facts disclosed that Curry was a partner in the
company engaged in manufacture of mortar, but not a partner in the plaintiff engaged in furnishing sand etc. The
Court at P. 426 (42 Atl.) said:
"At the trial the plaintiff, after he had testified
how much sand went into the mortar made by the defendant company from the time of the assignment to
it to the date of suit was asked, 'Do you know the cost
of that sand to the Charles Warren Co.? If so state
what the amount is.' (The assignment referred to appears to be assignment of a patented process for making ready mix mortar.)
The Court continued:
"Mr. Nrields objected, contending that to ascertain the price of materials used in the mortar business
in this case, current market prices of sand, lime, hair
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and such other materials as entered into its composition are the prices the Charles Warren Company, dealers in lime, hair, etc., are entitled to charge for the
sand and other materials. These prices represent the
cost of materials to the mortar business, and are proper amounts upon which to calculate profits."
(Holding that the testimony sought viz, cost of
materials, was not proper, the court said)
"We think this testimony is not admissible. The
contention made by the plaintiff is right if the premises were right; that is, if you were to put the Charles
Warren Company in a fiduciary relation of an agent
of the Charles Warren Company; in conjunction with
this man, your premises might be right, and the cost
price of the sand to them must be the price. But does any
such relation subsist here? Suppose that the Charles
Warren Company, at the time engaged in a large business, among other things, in a large sand business, having on hand large quantities of sand, which they bought
say for 10 cents a load (Whether they had it on hand
or bought it afterwards does not matter.) Then the
question arises, if they hand over to the new concern
1000 loads of the sand, whether they must i'urnish it
at the cost price to them or at a fair market price.
"If they do furnish it at what it cost them, then
Mr. Curry being associated with them in the manufacture of mortar, becomes a partner in the profits arising from the sand busi:pess, receiving profits from another business. We cannot see that it would be right,
unless the plaintiff can show that the sand used was
bought specifically for this purpose and that they were
therefore acting in a fiduciary capacity as agents in the
mortar transaction. If they were not, you are bound
by the market price, not the cost price. But that does
not arise in this case. We think, therefore, that the
testimony was not admissible."
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We submit that the Gray Farm, hay, grain, hired men,
pasture ,teams, wagons and trucks were not a part of the
partnership property. If they are to be so considered, Stevens would certainly be getting an unjust profit, as he furnished none. He put no money into them. If Gray presented a loss and asked him to stand half, I fancy I hear
the cry, ''Why should I, I was not a partner in the operations of the Loose Ranch."
In the case of "Miles v. Miles" (Mont.) 282 Pac. 37,
at page 41, Sylabus 5, the Montana Court said:
"It is contended by the plaintiff that the court
erred in overriili.ng his exception made to the credit
of $3,287.85 allowed defendant as a charge against the
partnership between Nov. 1st, ,1920, and Jan. 6, 1923.
It is argued by plaintiff that the supplies furnished by
the defendant could not have exceeded in amount
$25.00 per month for each herder and employee and
that at no time could the supplies have cost to exceed
$50.00 per month."

The Court found evidence conflicting but sustained the
allowance.
In the case of "Fuller v. El Paso Livestock Commission
Co.", 174 S. W. 930 (Texas), it appears that the El Paso
Livestock Commission Co. and John T. Cameron sued C. H.
Fuller and 0. B. Fuller for an accounting.
At page 933 (174 SW) under Sylabus 6 the Court said:
"Error is also assigned to the admission of testimony of J. T. Cameron as to. t~ expense' incident to
the delivery of 3213 head of cattle at El Paso. The
court's qualification of the bill shows that, when this
testimony was admitted, the defendants had not produced in court any vouchers or other evidence showing what had been the expenses of handling said 3213
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head of cattle, and as defendants had received the proceeds of the sale of said cattle, and were entitled to deduct therefron1 the original purchase prioo and the expenses of handling same, the court admitted the evidence as tending to show what sums C. H. and 0. B.
Fuller would be entitled to deduct as expenses of handling said cattle. The evidence was properly admitted
for the reason indicated in the qualification."
Counsel at page 27 and 28 of his brief cites the case of
"\Vootten Land and Fuel Company v. Ownbey," 265 Fed.
at page 91, as illustrative of. the kind of accounting which
a partner must render in order to entitle him to credit for
expenditures. That case is not applicable here; it involves
an accounting to minority stockholders of a corporation.
Books of account were provided and it was defendant's duty
to maintain said books and keep the accounts under his
obligation.
Counsel omitted from said case one item which we
think very significant. It is disclosed that Ownbey claimed
$1,914.97, the same being expenditure for intoxicating liquors. Objection was made to the item because there was
no evidence showing the portion of the liquor used by Ownbey for his personal uses. He testified, however, that it was
all used for the company, and the Court observes:
"We think that was sufficient to support the Master's finding as further particularization could not reasQilably be required of the final use of these liq.uors."
In our case Stevens knew that the only books of account
being kept were the bank accounts. He knew that when the
cattle were taken into Gray's feed yard they would be fed
the hay and grain raised by Gray. He knew that he was
not supplying any feed for Gray and that he was not pro-
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viding hired men, wagons and teams to look after hundreds
of head of cattle which Gray was caring for.
We admit Gray was a sucker; he put in his full time
for twenty-eight months while Stevens sat by waiting to
grab the expected profits. Stevens knew no books were
kept, he knew no agreement was made for keeping books.
Stevens knew that the cattle were being fed for beef
and that the larger cattle were being put into the feed
yards (Tr. 156; Tr. 158). It is undisputed that the steers
fattened by Gray weighed on the average of 1100 pounds
when put into the fe€d yard and 1300 pounds when taken
out (Tr. 197).
We submit the following excerpt from the testimony
(Tr. 196-197) is a confession by counsel that the Trial Court
committed no error in permitting defendant to testify to
the reasonable value of feeding cattle. The following questions were asked and answers given: (Tr. 196-197)
Q. ''Do you know whether or not there are various methods of feeding in this mountain country? What
we wish to know is whether or not there is a basis of
price per pound of gain; and a basis of so much per
day per head, and how it is determined, whether or not
you had-whether or not the weight of the animal
makes any difference, as to the price per day. Do you
know whether there is such a plan in this country?
A. "Yes.
Q. "You may explain what the different plans
are.
A. ''The commercial fed lots are based on so
much per day per hundred.
Q. "Do you know whether or not that per hundred
pounds is the weight of the animal; it that right?
A. ''That is right.
Q. "Can you illustrate?
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A. ''Well, say for instance a steer weighs 300
pounds at that time; it was four cents per hundred, that
would be twelve cents a day to feed them; it would be
four cents per hundred.
Q. ''All right.
A. "If the steer weighed a thousand pounds, it
would be forty cents a day, and today it is 80 cents.
Q. ''What did you say it was at that time?
A. "Four cents per day per hundred. Now I am
speaking of commercial lots.
THE COURT: "AND TODAY it is 80 cents as
compared with forty cents.
A. "Yes, and for a thousand pound steer, that is
pro rated out at the time the steer is weighed until he
is finished. At the latter part of the feeding, he would
be paying a dollar a day today.
Q. "Do you know the approximate weight of
steers being fed?
A. ''I know approximately the weight of the
steers I fed.
Q. "What was the approximate weight?
A. "My steers averaged around 1300 pounds out.
Q. ''What would they average in?
A. "They weighed something like 1100 pounds
in.
Q. ''Would that mean that the cost of feeding a
1100 pound steer would be forty cents a day?"
At this point counsel for plaintiff made the following
opposition (Tr. 197) :
MR. HANSEN: "We wish to object to this testimony as incompetent; counsel started out to base his
claim on the amount of hay and grain per day, and
there is no objection to showing how many pounds of
hay and grain and if he fixes the amount and the v~Iue
of the hay and grain, I think that is the measure of
damage."
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We submit that counsel's assigned error number one
is not made in good faith and that counsel's argument in
his brief from the last paragraph on page 13 to the middle
of page 21, and from page 38 to the last full paragraph on
page 47 is completely undermined by counsel's statement
that there is no objection to showing how many pounds of
hay and grain, and the value of the hay and grain in fixing the cost of feeding (Tr. 197).
Counsel's admission was certainly sufficient to mislead the Court, and in our opinion constitutes a waiver of
his assigned error number one.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITI'ED NO ERROR IN
ALLOWING DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR THE ITEMS
MENTIONED IN POINT FOUR OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
We agree with counsel in his statement on page 38 of
his brief that the cost of feed is not in dispute. Hay cost
$8.00 per ton or .4 cents per pound, corn cost from $1.50 to
$1.65 per hundred pounds or 1.5 cents to 1.65 cents per
pound, rolled barley cost $1.40 per hundred pounds or 1.4
cents per pound, cotton-seed meal (not oil) cost $50.00 per
ton or 2.5 cents per pound, bran cost $1.00 per hundred
pounds or 1 cent per pound (Tr. 354).
Defendant testified that he fed barley, corn, cottonseed meal, bran and hay in the following amounts: 10 pounds
of barley, 5 pounds of corn, 1 pound of cotton-seed meal, one
pound of bran, and 30 pounds of hay per day per head (Tr.
354-5).
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Plaintiff's counsel admits that defendant testified to
those amounts in his brief at page 38. Counsel computes
the total of the amount fed per head per day at 37 cents
lAppellant's brief, page 38). Counsel, however figures the
price of corn at $1.50 per hundred; at $1.65 per hundred
the cost per head per day fed as Gray testified would total
37.75 cents.
Plaintiff offered no testimony to dispr~:>ve the testimony
of defendant as to the amount of hay and grain fed the
partnership animals. Counsel admits it was proper for
defendant to show how many pounds of hay and grain he
fed and the value of the hay and grain in determining the
defendant's credit for feeding (Tr. 197).
The testimony of defendant is positive, and is undisputed, that he actually fed the quantities herein set out and
the value of said feed is not in dispute. No witness was
ever called to contradict the defendant's testimony. Plaintiff called as his witness Willis Provstgaard, who testified
that he fed cattle for the defendant practically all the time
including the years in question, 1937-38 and 1938-39 (Tr.
439). He, likewise, testified as to the men, teams, and wagons used in feeding the partnership cattle. In fact, plaintiff's counsel neither offered evidence to disprove his testimony nor raised any serious question thereon.
Mr. Provstgaard was called as plaintiff's witness; if any
one was in a position to contradict the defendant's testimony as to the amount of grain, bran, cotton-seed meal and
hay fed, it was the man who actually did the feeding. Plaintiff's counsel, however, refrained from asking th.e witness
any questions with respect to that matter; defendant's testimony remains uncontradicted.
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On the other hand counsel chose to dispute defendant's testimony by testimony of certain other witnesses as
to what they fed. That in no wise disputes defendant's testimony. It is doubtless true that cattle can be maintained
without losing weight on a much smaller feeding than when
"being fed for beef," which was the principal purpose stated
by plaintiff for entering into the partnership-to buy and
feed cattle, particularly steers, "to be fed and sold for beef"
(R. 29).
We invite the Court to read the testimony of the witnesses produced by plaintiff as to what they fed. In no instance did any witness produced by plaintiff testify to comparable feeding-the same number of cattle. No witness
testified to feeding the same type of cattle, and no witness
testified to using the same feed as defendant.
We shall not burden the Court except to make an observation with respect to the testimony of the following witnesses called by plaintiff: Fay C. Packard (Tr. 442); David
Jones (Tr. 93); Plaintiff, Edward R. Stevens (Tr. 520); Gilbert A. Johnson (Tr. 502); William Christmas (Tr. 555);
Glen Cowan (Tr. 478); Vaughn Davis (Tr. 466); David Shuler (Tr. 458); and Howard Stevens (Tr. 551). We invite
tJhe Court to read the testimony of these witnesses. The
most potent argument in answer to plaintiff will be found
in their testimony.
Mr. Packard testified on cross-examination that he
worked in the bank, and our office hours are from "eight
until we get through." (Tr. 451). That he never fed the
cattle, but checked on them (Tr. 447). That he had no
personal information with respect to the feeding except
what the bookkeeper gave him (Tr. 452).
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David Jones testified that he fed on the average of
fifty head (Tr. 494); that the feeding period depended on
the condition of the cattle (Tr. 496). He admitted on crossexamination that in addition to the quantities of hay, barley and wheat set out in appellant's brief, he also fed two
pounds of beet syrup per day (Tr. 500) . That he likewise
fed beet pulp (Tr. 501). Mr. Jones was asked as to the
average increase of weight during the feeding period; he
admitted he had records which he could produce of the
weights in and the weights out (Tr. 498). The Court permitted him to answer with the understanding that the records would be produced and made available to defendant's
counsel (Tr. 499). The witness was never recalled to testify further, nor did defendant's attorney ever receive the
records.
Edward R. Stevens testified that he fed mostly corn,
barley and alfalfa hay (Tr. 540). He testified that his
statement as to the amount of feed an animal would consume was not based on any records (Tr. 598-9). He testified that he did not know whether or not it takes mor.e feed
to properly feed a larger steer than it would take to feed
a smaller steer (Tr. 550).
The plaintiff was recalled and testified that the 77 head
of cattle fed by his son were the cattle shown in exhibit
''F" (Tr. 581).
Gilbert A. Johnson testified that he fed all kinds of
cattle (Tr. 502). That he fed only about 30 to 60 head per
year (Tr. 504). That he never fed steers alone, but steers
heifers and cows (Tr. 505). That he fed pea silage and dry
beet pulp in addition to the grain (Tr. 506). That he considers a pound to a pound and a quarte:tr of grain per day
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per hundred pounds of weight of the animal is good feeding (Tr. 504).
William Christmas testified that everybody feeds different, that he fed about a pound of grain per head per day
for each hundred pounds of animal throughout the whole
feeding period (Tr. 562). He testified that he did not know
the weight of the cattle when put in his feed yard nor the
weight when taken out (Tr. 568); that he just guesses at
what he fed (Tr. 568). That he had no record of the gain
in weight during the feeding period (Tr. 568-9).
Glen L. Cowan (plaintiff's witness) contradicted the
testimony of plaintiff and stated that larger animals consume more than smaller ones (Tr. 480). That he fed seven
and one-third pounds of grain per day and ten pounds of
hay (Tr. 483). He testified specifically to feeding 220 head
of yearlings in 1946-7 (Tr. 485). That he generally fed
yearlings (Tr. 480); that the 220 head were steers and heifers mixed (Tr. 481). He testified that steers eat more
than heifers (Tr. 482).
Mr. Cowan testified that the animals he fed in 1946-7
went into his feed .Jot October 2nd, and were taken out one
load per week beginning December 7th (Tr. 483); the last
ones being taken out January 23rd (Tr. 482). Even if the
220 head had remained in the feed lot until January 23rd
the yearlings fed by Mr. Cowan in 1946-7 would have to eat
over forty pounds of corn silage per day, if they ate the
500 tons which appellant's counsel admits was fed to them
(Appellant's brief page 39). The total period from October 2nd, 1946, to Janu_ary 23rd, 1947 is 113 days; the total
animal days is arrived at by multiplying 220 by 113, which
gives us 24,860 animal days and if each of the animals fed
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by Mr. Cowan in 1946 were fed for the full 113 days, each
would consume over 40 pounds of corn silage.
David Shuler testified that he fed the partnership steers
in 1937-8 under a written contract (Exhibit "K"). The contract discloses that Shuler was to be charged six cents a
pound for the total weight of the animals when taken in;
and was to be allowed seven and one-half cents when taken
out (Tr. 460). He testified that at the end of the 75-day
period he refused to feed them any longer unless the price
was "sweetened", and an oral contract was made for an additional 29-day period under which he was to receive 8 cents
per pound for the animals when turned back or an additional ~'2-cent spread during the whole period (Tr. 460-1).
Shuler testified that he fed only alfalfa hay and eorn for
the first 75-day period (Tr. 465). He further testified that
during the whole feeding period he fed only corn and alfalfa hay (Tr. 465). He admits he may have fed some
pulp, but could not remember (Tr. 466). Shuler's contract
gave him 2 cents per pound on the total weight of the animals fed, even though they were fed only enough to maintain their weight without any gain; if he took in a steer at
a thousand pounds he would be charged $60.00; when that
same steer was returned after the 75 days of feeding he
would receive under the written contract $75.00, even if it
had not gained a pound, or $15.00 profit for feeding the
animal over a 75-day period no more than was sufficient
to maintain it without losing weight. If the animal gained
one hundred pounds in the 104 day period testified to by
Mr. Shuler (Tr. 460) he would receive 8 cents per pound
for eleven hundred pounds of weight, or $88.00. Since the
animal was charged in to him at six cents a pound, or $60.00,
he would be paid $28.00 for feeding 104 days only sufficient
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feed to add 100 pounds total weight. When asked if he
had any recollection as to what the steers increase in weight
he answered, ''No, I would not be able to say" (Tr. 461).
On further prodding by appellant's eounsel the witness gave
it as his judgment that they increase one and three-quarter
pounds a day (Tr. 463). Counsel asked the following question: Q. "When you say a pound and a quarter per day is
that what steers increase when they are properly fed?"
and Mr. Shuler gave the following answer: A. "That is
what I generally figure." (Tr. 463). Mr. Shuler testified
he did not remember how much corn or hay he fed during
the last 30-day period (Tr. 466). Counsel makes considerable of the fact that he fed during the last 30-day period
for 30 cents per head per day, yet we have no evidence as
to the amount of hay or grain he fed, nor as to any gain
in weight, if any, during said 30-day period.
Vaughn Davis was called as a witness for plaintiff;
his testimony was substantially set out on PP. 17 and 18
of appellant's brief. He testified that he was to get 10
cents per day or 10 cents per pound of increase in weight
(Tr. 467). He testified that he did not have to hire any
help (Tr. 470); that he did not know the weights of the
cattle when they were brought in, and he had no record
of the gains in weight (Tr. 468). He testified he did not
know the amount of hay he fed, the amount of barley he
fed, the amount of wheat he fed nor the amount of beet
pulp (Tr. 472). That he received intermittent payments
for the feeding, that he didn't know the amount of any payment (Tr. 472). On redirect examination he testified that
he fed about 20 pounds of hay per day, 8 pounds of grain,
and 50 pounds of beet pulp per head per day (Tr. 474). He
testified that he did not know when the cattle came in and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
did not know when they were taken back (Tr. 476). He
testified that Mr. Gray furnished no feed, and that his
brother got no grain from Gray.
Lavar Davis was called as a witness for defendant and
testified that he was a brother of Vaughn Davis (Tr. 587);
that he and his brother owned the ranch where the Stevens
and Gray cattle were fed, together (Tr. 587). He testified
that hay other than that raised on the ranch was fed these
cattle· (Tr. 587). That grain other than what was raised
on the ranch was fed the cattle (Tr. 588). That he secured
grain from Mr. Gray at Gray's ranch (Tr. 588). That he,
Vaughn Davis, and another brother assisted in feeding the
cattle (Tr. 488). That 3 tons of beet pulp was hauled each
day from the Spanish Fork factory, a distance of 7 miles;
that the full3 tons of beet pulp was fed each day to 64 head
of animals (Tr. 589) .
If the 64 head of cattle were fed 3 tons of beet pulp
per day, they were fed more than 90 pounds per head per
day.
The testimony of Vaughn Davis is not only completely
repudiated by his brother, Lavar Davis, but the very eontract he claims to have had with the partnership shows a
lack of any business sense whatsoever on the part of the
feeder, and is entirely incredible. As heretofore observ~
his testimony was that he was to get 10c per day per head
or 10c per pound of increase in weight (Tr. 467). Let it
be assumed that the latter statement is the one he intended (l.Oc per pound of increase in weight). If Davis fed
on the basis of 10c per pound for each pound of increase
he certainly had a contract much less favorable than the
Shuler contract. As pointed, in this brief, Shuler would
receive for feeding a 1000-lb. animal for 75 days $15.00, even
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if it never increased one pound in weight. The evidence discloses that the contract with Shuler was sweetened to allow him 2c per pound of increase for feeding over a period
of 104 days (Tr. 460-1). For a hundred pound increase
under the 104 days Shuler would receive $28.00 for increasing the weight from .1000 lbs. to 1100 lbs.; yet Davis testified he would have received only $10.00
It is significant that when the testimony of Lavar Da-

vis is analyzed, it will be found that instead of receiving
19.56c per day per head ,as claimed by counsel in his brief
at page 43, it will be found that the Davises received in excess of 34c per head per day for feeding such as they fed
which included no corn, no bran, no cotton-seed meal and
no such quantities of concentrated food as were fed by the
defendant.
The Court must guess in each case as to what was fed,
and likewise guess as to the increase in weight.
At P. 19 of his brief appellant's counsel sets out the
testimony of Howard Stevens; he stated that he fed 77 head
of cattle in the winter of 1937-8 for a period of 130 days
(Tr. 552). It was stipulated that the cattle fed by Howard
Stevens are the cattle described in plaintiff's Exhibit "F''
entitled Bill of Sale, that it covered 46 head of steers, 25
head of steers, and 6 head of steers (Tr. 581). Howard
Stevens is the only -witness that affords any basis of comparative feeding with the feeding done by Gray. He testified under oath that the steers when taken in weighed about
950 pounds. Exhibit ''F" shows the weight of cattle when
sold out as follows:
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:WMBER
46 Head
25 Head
6 Head

77

\VEIGHT
49,307
26,775
5,578

AVERAGE WEIGHT
1072
1071
929

81,660

The total weight of the 77 head was 81,660 or an average of 1060, the evidence conclusively shows that the
cattle fed by Howard Stevens had an average gain of 110
pounds over the full feeding period. It would appear from
Exhibit "F" that some of the cattle lost weight; we are not
surprised that at feeding such as Howard Stevens testified
to that the cattle gained only 110 pounds, that is the type
of feeding that barely keeps cattle alive.
Counsel for plaintiff suggests that 25 cents a day is a
proper charge to be allowed for feeding cattle. If it be assumed that that is a proper charge for feeding cattle, the
way Howard Stevens fed them, then a proper charge for
feeding cattle the way the defendant fed them (so that they
gained over a period of 141 days an average weight of 200
pounds) (Tr. 197) would be 41.9 cents per day. Formula25 X 130/141 X 200j110 equals 41.9c
Counsel suggests that the cost of feed supplied by Howard Stevens is valued at 19c (Appellant's brief P. 41). Counsel made no allowance for services of Stevens which should
be worth $2.50 per day or 3~c per day per head, or a total
of 22%,c.
With a gain of 110 pounds per animal over a feeding
period of 130 days the gain per day would be .846 of a
pound. We submit that with a gain of 200 pounds as testified to by Mr. Gray over a feeding period of 141 days the
gain per day is 200/141 of one pound per day or a gain of
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1.418 pounds per day. The cost of feed on the proportionate basis of gain of weight per day furnished by Mr. Gray
would be 1.418/.846 multiplied by 22.25, which is 37¥2 per
day.
As we have observed with respect to the feeding by
Howard Stevens, there is an expense over and above the
221,4 eents indicated on account of the pea silage fed and
on account of the barley which he testified he fed during
the first 30 days. It will likewise be observed that in computing the cost of his feeding no allowance has been made
for the use of any truck, gas and oil, nor for any horses or
wagon; therefore, the actual cost of feeding by Stevens
would be above the 221;4c by the additional items of pea
silage, barley, truck, gas, oil, horses and wagon which must
necessarily constitute additional expense.
We, therefore, submit that the Trial Court was justified from the evidence offered by the defendant, which was
never contradicted by the man who did the feeding (Willis
Provstgaard), in allowing defendant 36lj2 c per day for feeding the partnership cattle. In fact, no witness called by
plaintiff ever fed cattle the amount of feed or variety of
feed that the defendant fed.
The only witness called who did feeding comparable
to the feeding by the defendant was Rodney Martin; yet
he fed no bran and no cotton-seed meal. Under examination by plaintiff's attorney he tetsified that he fed an average of 12 to 15 pounds of grain over the whole feeding period (Tr. 606). He likewise fed 4 pounds of dried beet pulp
molasses treated, and about 18 pounds of hay (Tr. 603).
He further testified that during the early feeding period he
fed 30 pounds of hay (Tr. 609); and that he fed 2 pounds of
corn silage (Tr. 604) .
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We submit that an examination of the testimony with
respect to feeding will lead to the conclusion that the Trial
Court was justified in awarding the defendant 361j2 per day
per animal for feeding the partnership cattle.
Counsel likewise takes issue with the allowance by the
Trial Court of $1.50 per month per head for pasturing partnership cattle, and has stated in his brief that the charge
of running in Strawberry cost $1.00 per head per month
(Appellant's brief, page 37). Counsel likewise called as
a witness William Christmas, who testified that his charge
for pasturing cattle on property he had leased at Keetley,
Utah (the Fisher Ranch) was $1.00 per month per head
(Tr. 561).
We invited the Court's attention to the type of pasture
used by the defendant compared with grazing on the Public Domain and the pasture used by Mr. Christmas. At the
top of the page (Tr. 158) the defendant described his ranch.
He stated there were 600 acres, all under irrigation; that
the same was divided into four separate pastures, that the
cattle rotated from pasture to pasture, grazing a two-weeks
period in each during which time the grazed pasture was
irrigated and at the end of 6 to 8 weeks was again used
for grazing the cattle.
No description of the type of ground grazed in Strawberry was given, but it is a part of the Public Domain, and
we submit far less valuable than the pasture such as described by Mr. Gray.
The ground operated by William Christmas consisted
of 1900 acres of which approximately 500 acres was meadow and the balance hillside (Tr. 571). The plaintiff testified on cross-examination as follows:
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Q. "Mr. Stevens you say the winter of 1938, if
I understood you correctly in the neighborhood of
Keetley.
A. "Yes, if I remember right.
Q. ''How many cattle did you pasture?
A. "20 head.
Q. "How long did you pasture them?
A. "Four months, if I remember right.
Q. ''Whose pasture did you put them in?
A. "It was at what they call the Fisher Ranch,
William Christmas was taking the cattle to pasture at
that time.
Q. "Did you take the cattle up there yourself?
A. "I went With them.
Q. ''And you paid $80.00 for that pasture?
A. "If I remember right, I did.
Q. "Well did you?
A. "I think I did.
Q. ''You pastured them for a $1.00 per month?
A. "That is right.
Q. "Who did you pay it to?
A. "William Christmas, if I remember right.
Q. "You said they were on the Fisher Ranch?
A. "Yessir, I did." (Tr. 543-4) ~

Mr. Christmas testified that he pastured cattle on the
Flisber Ranch at Keetley for plaintiff, and that he charged
plaintiff for taking the cattle from the ranch to the pasture at Keetley in addition to the $1.00 per month (Tr. 5667). We submit that the pasture of Mr. Christmas in no
ways compared with the 600 acres of irrigated ground devoted to pasture by the defendant. The Christmas ground
was not in any way comparable with the pasture of the defendant, and the evidence affords ample justification for
the allowance by the Trial Court of $1.50 per month for
pasturing the cattle of the partnership.
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Counsel for appellant objects to the allowance by the
Trial Court of labor, of four men at $2.50 per day per man
and the use of the three teams, wagons and harness at $2.50
per day in feeding the cattle. Defendant testified that four
men were employed during the entire feeding period; and
that they were paid either $2.50 or $3.00 per day; and that
three teams and wagons were also employed during the
feeding period (Tr. 420-2).
Willis Provstgaard, called by plaintiff, testified that
three men besides himself were employed, and either three
or four teams and wagons. That the men were paid $2.50
per day (Tr. 439-40).
We direct the Court's attention to Paragraph 11 of defendant's amended counterclaim (R. 46), and particularly
to the credits claimed therein by defendant for pasturing
and feeding partnership cattle. We likewise invite the
Court's attention to plaintiff's reply to defendant's amended counterclaim, and particularly to Paragraph 8A thereof (R. 58 and 59). It will be observed that plaintiff does
not dispute defendant's claim for pasturing the cattle, but
only disputes his charge in the amount of $1.50 per month,
and admits with respect to each item defendant is entitled
to $1.00 per month.
We submit that as to any items set out in said Par. 11,
not admitted by plaintiff, that the testimony fully supports
the Court's finding as to those items (Tr. 157, 191, 192, 200,
201, 245, 247 and 248).
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF CREDIT FOR THE SUM
OF $215.00 FOR FEEDING FORTY-THREE HEAD OF
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CATTLE DURING THE WINTER 1946-47 (1936-37)
MENTIONED IN POINT TWO OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
In appellant's brief, page 3, it is alleged that defendant admitted that plaintiff was entitled to credit of $215.00
for feeding forty-three head of calves during the winter of
1937-38. Let us examine the record: In paragraph 6 of
plaintiff's amended complaint it is alleged that he wintered
forty-three head of Grantsville cattle during the winter of
1937-38 (R. 32).
Defendant in Paragraph 4 of his answer to Amended
Complaint denied that plaintiff ever wintered any cattle
for the partnership after 1936-37; he admitted that plaintiff wintered cattle that belonged to the partnership during the winter of 1936-37 (R. 36).
In his reply to defendant's answer to the Amended Complaint plaintiff adroitly admits that the forty-three head of
cattle wintered by plaintiff was during the winter of 193738 (R. 54). It will be observed that plaintiff thereby admits his own allegation that the Grantsville calves were
wintered in 1937-38. He never denied that he wintered
partnership cattle in 1936-7; it is true that it was stipulated
that plaintiff wintered partnership cattle (Tr. 10). The
plaintiff alleges he did and defendant admits he did; the
dispute is as to what cattle were wintered and when.
The only testimony ever given by Stevens so far as
we are able to ascertain is found on pp. 542 and 543 of the
transcript.
After the plaintiff. had testified that he fed cattle during the winters of 1936 and 7, 37 and 38 and 39 (Tr. 538)
he was then asked if he was asking for credit for wintering cattle; and he answered he was (Tr. 542). At no time
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did the plaintiff identify the cattle wintered, where they
were wintered, or in which year they were wintered.
It was alleged in paragraph 5 of defendant's counterclaim (R. 40) that defendant purchased, on October 30,
1937, 215 head of cattle from Johnson and Wrathall, Plaintiff in his reply to defendant's counterclaim admits that
defendant made said purchase (R. 55).
Mr. Gray testified that the Wrathall and Johnson cattle
(215 head) were purchased at Grantsville (Tr. 180).
Mr. Gray was asked what disposition was made of the
cattle that he purchased in Grantsville, and he answered:
That they received the cattle over there; and weighed them
and trailed them to St. Johns one day; the next day they
took them to Fairfield and from Fairfield to Mosida, and
the cattle were wintered at Mosida (Tr. 188).
The cattle left at Mosida were wintered by Selby Dixon
(Tr. 162-3).
Mr. Stevens testified that Mr. Gray purchased certain
cattle for the partnership and testified as follows:
A. "There was one bunch 215 head, if I remember right and another bunch of 20 head.
Q. ''Do you know where they were put?
A. "Where they were put?
Q. "Yes.
A. "No, I don't remember it now." (Tr. 24).
The cattle purchased by plaintiff are set out in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint (R. 30). Mr.
Stevens testified as to the purchase, from whom purchased
and where purchased. The testimony discloses that Stevens purchased no cattle at Grantsville.
The only cattle purchased at Grantsville were the ones
purchased by defendant Gray (Tr. 188-9). Defendant tes-
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tified that two bunches were purchased at Grantsville. It
is alleged in paragraph 5 of defendant's amended counterclaim (R. 40) and admitted in paragraph 2A of plaintiff's
reply (R. 55) that defendant purchased 215 head from
Wrathall and Johnson on October 30, 1937; and that on
September 23rd he purchased from Morris Wrathall and
from Paul Wrathall 29 head. The defendant was asked
the following question and gave the following answer:
Q. "Do you know what the total number of cattle
you purchased at Grantsville was?
A. ''217 and 29.
Q. "And 29 of them were sold?
A. "29 were sold.
Q. "And the others were taken to Mosida?
A. "Yes, to Mosida.
Q. "Do you know what time they arrived at Mosida?
A. "Sometime the latter part of October.
MR. HANSEN: "What year?
A. "1937.
Q. ''These are the cattle bought where?
A. "Grantsville." (Tr. 189).
If plaintiff had wintered 43 head orf Grantsville cattle

he would not have answered that he did not remember
where they were put. The record is undisputed that the
Grantsville cattle were all wintered at Mosida and none
were wintered by Stevens.
POINT FlOUR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ER!ROR IN
MAKING ITS FINDING NO. 5 (R. 80) AND IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR THE ITEMS MEN-
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TIONED IN POINT THREE OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
The plaintiff assigns error on the part of the Court in
allowing defendant the following items:
S4.08 Jackson Motor Company (R. 42).
$65.00 for hay purchased from Hyrum McClellan (R.
43).
$193.00 for hay purchased from Albert McClellan (R.
43).

$19.78 for lumber to repair feed racks (R. 44).
$22.90 telephone expense (R. 43).
S19.20 telephone expense (R. 43).
and $84.50 paid to R. E. Hluber for hay (R. 46).

As to the item of $4.08 paid to Jackson Motor Company,
the following will be observed: Defendant offered exhibits
10-A, 10-B, 10-C and 10-D. Counsel for plaintiff objected
to Ex. 10-A, 10-B, and 10-C. Further testimony was given
as to Ex. 10-C and counsel for plaintiff asked to examine
10-C; then counsel for defendant said he desired to inquire
about 10-A, 10-B and 10-C, at which point plaintiff's counsel stated: We will withdraw it with respect to all except
the $2.50, which was (Ex. 10-A). The $4.08 about which
counsel complained was admitted after counsel withdrew
his objection to Ex. 10-B (Tr. 212). Further inquiry was
not made with respect to the item, and if the Court committed any error counsel for plaintiff invited it. We cannot now show what we would have shown with respect to
it.
As to the item of $65.00 paid to Hyrum McClellan (Ex.
21) and the item of $193.00 paid to· Albert M·cClellan (Ex.
22); the defendant testified that he paid $65.00 to Hyrum
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McClellan for hay to feed the cattle and the same was for
partnership purpose (Tr. 215). He further testified that
the $193.00 was paid to Albert McClellan for hay to feed
the cattle brought in from the range (Tr. 215-6). Counsel
for appellant inquired if defendant was not claiming the
item twice, once as hay and once as the reasonable charge
for feeding the cattle, to which counsel for defendant answered that it was for hay for the cattle between wintering and feeding in pasture, and that it is not claimed in
Par. 11 (Tr. 216).
As to the item $19.78 for lumber to repair feed racks
(Ex. 54) defendant testified that it was necessary to have
the feed lot fixed up in order to feed the cattle (Tr. 227).
We submit that the item is a proper partnership expense;
defendant testified it was necessary in order to feed the
cattle. Assume defendant had been required to secure the
services of a veterinarian to care for some of the cattle,
could there be any question as to the same being proper
partnership expense?

As to the item of $22.90 and $19.20 (Exs. 47 and 49)
telephone expense claimed by defendant, defendant testified that the expense was for the benefit of the company
(Tr. 225). We submit that it is impossible to conceive of
defendant having overcharged the partnership in his claim
for $42.10 in connection with the partnership business over
a period of 28 months, defendant's testimony supports this
view (Tr. 359-61).
As to the item of $84.50 (Ex. 101) the defendant testified that the same was given to R. E. Huber for hay to
feed the cattle in April, 1938 (Tr. 242). On redirect ex-
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amination defendant testified as follows: "I looked it up,
for cattle we wintered and brought in early to my place."
Q.
A.

"Were they partnership cattle?
"Yes." (Tr. 373-74).
POINT FIVE

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED
FOR IDS OWN USE THE SUM OF $77,145.49 FROM THE
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP CATTL\E MENTIONED IN
POINT FIVE OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
Plaintiff assigns errors on the part of the Court in
charging defendant with only $76,145.49 from the sale of
cattle. The record discloses that the defendant charged
himself with the sale of 206 head of steers on March 2, 1939
in the full sum of $18,839.80, being the second to the last
item in paragraph 6 of defendant's amended counterclaim
(R. 41). The said $18,839.80 included an overpayment from
Cudahy and Company to defendant of $1,000.00. The actual purchase price of the 206 head of cattle sold March
2, 1939, was $17,839.80.
In Par. 7 of plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 32) plaintiff alleges that on March 4, 1939, plaintiff and defendan,t
were owing the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork the sum
of $3,000.00 on a partnership note in the amount of
$6.000.00. In defendant's answer to plaintiff's amended
complaint Par. 5 (R. 37) defendant denied the foregoing
allegation and alleged that the $6,000.00 note was held by
the Bank of Spanish Fork and not the Commercial Bank
of Spanish Fork.
Defendant further alleges that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
$4,300.00 note (Ex. C) set out in Par. 7 of plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 32-33) was paid by plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff having paid $3,300.00 and defendant $1,000.00.
As heretofore observed in our brief, page__J__, the defendant testified that he went into the bank and paid Mr. Dixon
(Tr. 423)
We submit that a reading of the testimony during the
time Mr. Dixon was on the stand (Tr. 75-83) will disclose
that there is no dispute as to the payment by the defendant of $1,000.00 upon the $4,300.00 note (Ex. C). We are
not unmindful of defendant's testimony referred to on page
6 of appellant's brief. It is our contentionJ however, that
there is no dispute as to what the facts are; it was admitted by counsel for plaintiff that a cashier's check for
$1,000.00 was issued to someone who had been paid in advance (Tr. 77). .
Counsel for plaintiff during the· time Mr. Dixon was
on the stand made the following statement:
''--that later on Mr. Dixon, as I understand his testimony, prevailed on Mr. Gray to endorse the $10,000.00
note; that Mr. Stevens later on paid that note except
$1,000.00 which was paid by Mr. Gray--Now these are
the facts which we will wish to show by this series of transactions, and that this $4,300.00 note went into the partnership and that is already agrood. Now we wish to show
the indebtedness represented by this note is contined and
$1,000.00 was paid by Mr. Gray and the principal and interest by Mr. Stevens." (Tr. 79).
Counsel for plaintiff stated:
MR. HANSEN: "The only thing I am now interested
in is whether you admit that this note of $4,300.00 was
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paid, a thousand by Gray on the date he claims, and the rest
was paid by Mr. Stevens. If you will admit that I don't care
anything about the other ramification of it."
MR. WORTHEN: "You mean on the note which was
given at the time this was taken up."
MR. HANSEN: "He paid $3,300.00 and Mr. Gray paid
a $1,000.00; that is all I am interested in." (Tr. 80).
Defendant's counsel stated:
MR. PORTER: "We are willing to stipulate that this
Exhibit C was paid; and that the evidence of the pay would
be that on March 18, 1941, Gray paid $1,000.00 and that
the balance of the note was paid by Mr. Stevens. Now as
I understand it that would be their testimony." (Tr. 81).
Counsel for defendant further stated:
MR. PORTER: '' That will be their testimony, that
the ExhibitC was the note from the Bank of Spanish Fork;
and that it was merged into the obligation of Mr. Stevens
at the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, on or about the
13th day of November, 1939; and that the testimony of
Mr. Dixon would be that upon the obligation into which
this was merged, Mr. Gray paid $1000.00 on the 18th day
of March, 1941; and that his testimony would be further,
that Mr. Stevens paid the balance." (Tr. 81).
We call the Court's attention to plaintiff's reply to the
answer (R. 53) and particularly to P. 12 thereof (R. 64).
It will be observed that plaintiff sets out the amounts with
which defendant should be charged; the first item reads as
follows: Cash admittedly received from sale of cattle, the
amount originally typed in was $77,145.49 that amount has
been changed to $76,145.49. Several other changes have
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been made substituting figures in ink for figures originally
typed on that page (R. 64), in order to reconcile the total
with the changes made in the various items.
We submit that plaintiff's counsel had forgotten when
he prepared his brief that his pleadings admit that the cash
received f~om the sale of cattle by defendant was $76,145.49;
certainly the Court was justified in charging defendant with
only $76,145.49.
Defendant was either entitled to have the figure showing the amount received from sales of cattle reduced
$1,000.00 to $76,145.49 or to have credit of $1,000.00 to
which he was entitled for moneys expended for the partnership. Defendant certainly is not entitled to be charged
with the full $77,145.49 which included the overpayment
to Cudahy without being credited with that payment at
some other place in the account.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'ITED NO ERROR IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED
FOR HIS OWN USE THE AMOUNTS MENTIONED IN
FOINT SIX OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
In point six set out in the index appellant's counsel contends that defendant received $341.04 from the sale of two
steers, and $356.00 from the sale of seven cows belonging
to the partnership.
Under point 6 as the same is set out on page 24 of appellant's brief and again on page 52 of appellant's brief appellant seeks to charge defendant with three items as follows:
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$341.0-1 for the sale of 3 steers.
$201.62 for the sale of 2 steers.
S356 for the sale of 7 cows belonging to the partnership.
The Court's attention is called to paragraph 6 of defendant's further answer and counterclaim (R. 40 and 41);
defendant sets out in said paragraph the list of cattle sold
and the amounts received by the respective partners from
the proceeds of said sales. Defendant charges himself with
the first four items set out in said paragraph, the next four
items he charges to the plaintiff, to-wit:
3 steers $341.04.
2 steers $201.62.
7 cows $356.00, sold at Delta.
1 steer $99.00
In plaintiff's answer to defendant's amended counterclaim plaintiff denied that" he received the proceeds from
the sale of the last four mentioned items. Plaintiff's assignment of errors No. 6 is directed to the Court's finding on
that issue in favor of defendant.
May we observe at the outset that counsel in his brief
at P. 52 concedes that the plaintiff should be charged with
the $99.00 for the sale of one steer, which item plaintiff denied receiving (R. 56).
As to the items of $341.04 and $201.62, defendant testified that he had in the feed lot seventeen head of company cattle; that one cow brought $52.26, 2 heifers brought
$91.46 and 2 cows brought $112.75 (Tr. 141). He further
testified that 3 steers brought $341.04, that 2 steers brought
$201.62, that one steer brought $99.00 (Tr. 141).
Defendant testified that he received from the proceeds
of said sales the sum of $256.41, that plaintiff received the
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balance of $997.66. The $256.41 which defendant admits
he received represents the price received from the first 3
items shown at the top of the page under sales (R. 41).
The first four items listed on said page under debit Stevens
represents the $997.66 which defendant testified was received by the plaintiff (R. 41) (Tr. 141).
On cros.s examination defendant testified as follows:
Q. "I am referring to these debits that you have
made to Stevens here $341.04, $201.65, $90.00 and
$356.00. I understood you to say that Stevens got that
money, is that right?
A. "That is right." (Tr. 305).

As to the 7 cows sold at Delta for $356.00 included in
the charges against Stevens we submit that the testimony
of the plaintiff is the most ·convincing testimony that could
be offered in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff under cross examination testified that he
was not at Delta at the time the 7 head of cows were sold
(Tr. 664-65) The plaintiff next testified that he did not
remember that he was in Delta at the time the cattle were
sold (Tr. 67).
On redirect examination the witness was asked the
following questions and gave the following answers:
Q. "Well did you participate in the sale of them?
A. "If I remember right I was there when the
cattle were sold.
Q. ''You were there when they were sold; where
were they sold?
A. "As I remember they were sold at Delta, Utah.
Q. "Well were the cattle at Delta when they were
sold?
A. "Yessir." (Tr. 69).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

Defendant testified that the seven cows were sold to
Evan Johnson at Delta and that plaintiff got the money
for them (Tr. 139).
On cross examination defendant testified that St&Yens was there when the seven cows were sold; that they
were sold at Delta and Stevens got the money (Tr. 315316).
Clyde Cowan testified that he hauled seven head of
cattle from Garrison, Utah, to Delta, Utah. That he saw
Mr. Stevens at Garrison, Utah, when he loaded the cattle;
and saw both Mr. Stevens and Mr. Gray at Delta after the
cattle were unloaded, that he delivered the weigh bills for
the cattle (Tr. 590-2).
We submit that there was substantial and competent
evidence to justify the Court in finding that plaintiff received the items mentioned in plaintiff's assignment of errors No.6. The Court saw the witnesses and heard them
testify and his finding is supported by the evidence.
POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
FAILING TO CHARGE DEFENDANT WITH AT LEAST
THIRTY-ONE HEAD OF PARTNERSIDP CATILE MENTIONED IN POINT SEVEN OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
Under point 7 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff claims that
defendant failed to account for 31 head of partnership cattle. On P. 55 of his brief counsel sets out that plaintiff
failed to account for 35 head.
In Par. 8A of plaintiff's answer to the amended counterclaim (R. 61) plaintiff alleges on information and belief that
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defendant had disposed of 109 head of cattle to persons and
for amounts unknown to plaintiff for which he had not
accounted. Yet in Par. lOA of answer to amended counterclaim plaintiff admits that defendant had accounted for
1370 head of the 1405 head purchased for the partnership
(R. 62).
On P. 10 of appellant's brief it is stated, "it is further
made to appear that defendant for the most part had the
exclusive possession of the partnership cattle especially
while they were in the feed lots being fattened for market."

It is undisputed, however, that the largest block of
partnership cattle ever sold were sold by the plaintiff, 405
head. He contracted for said sale; he received the check;
it was made to him personally and was deposited by him
in his name (Tr. 24-25).
It is undisputed that 7 head of cattle were sold at Delta
in March of 1937 and that plaintiff received the money (Tr.
69, 139, 590-2).

The testimony discloses that a substantial number of
cattle ~ere under the control and direction of the plaintiff
during the winter of 1936 and 37. 500 head of cattle were
purchased by plaintiff between Nov. 24 and Dec. 10, 1936,
25 head (Gonder cattle) were purchased in the month of
March, 1937 (Par. 5 Amended Complaint, R. 31).
Mr. Stevens testified he purchased cattle from Mr. Oakley on Nov. 23, 1936; that 3 head were put into the feed
yard and the balance were turned into the herd we wintered otherwise. (Tr. 17).

Mr. Stevens testified that some of the cattle he purchased in the fall of 1936 were taken to the Selby Dixon
ranch at Mosida (Tr. 23). That he did not know how many
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head were turned to Mr. Dixon and he did not know how
many head were fed by Mr. Gray.
It was stipulated that Selby Dixon wintered cattle in
· 1936-37 and 37 and 38; he testified that during the first
year he wintered their cattle (1936-37) there were over
200 head (Tr. 165).
Mr. Gray testified that 7 head of the Gonder cattle
were brought from Nevada and put in his feed lot (Tr. 139- ,
40).
He testified that he had a total of 17 head of partnership cattle in his feed lot in the spring of 1937 and t:hat he
had 300 of his own and 36 of Mr. Stevens (Tr. 141).
Defendant corrected his testimony as to the number
of head in the spring of 37 to 18 instead of 17 (Tr. 142).
On cross examination Mr. Gray testified that the cattle
he had at the ranch in the spring of 1937 were cattle that
Stevens bought in the fall of 1936 and some in the spring
of 1937 (Tr. 300). He further testified ''the bunch of cattle,
around 17 or 18 head, they were to winter over we put in
the feed lot with my cattle which I had around 300 head
of steers at the time on feed" (Tr. 300).
The defendant was asked what disposition was made
of the cattle placed in the feed lot, to which he answered,
"they were sold" (Tr. 140-141).
Defendant testified to the sale of the animals in his
feed lot, which are the animals discussed under point 6 of
plaintiff's brief, page 52, and under point 6 of respondent's
brief. We submit that the evidence establishes conclusively
that defendant wintered only 17 or 18 head of partnership
cattle during the winter of 1936-37 (Tr. 141).
Defendant made no charge to the partnership, whatsoever, for feeding partnership cattle in the winter of 1936-
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37; the first charge made by defendant against the partnership for pasturing or feeding any cattle was in May of
1937 (R. 46).
Plaintiff testified that 3 of the Oakley cattle were put
into the feed yard and the others were turned into the herd
we wintered otherwise."
The plaintiff testified that all the cattle except the
Garrison and Baker cattle (186 head) were taken away and
put in the yards here in Utah County (Tr. 73).
We submit that the testin1ony establishes that in the
spring of 1937 Gray had in his feed lot 300 head of his own
steers, 36 of Stevens' steers; that he had possession of no
partnership cattle during the winter of 36 and 37 except 17
or 18 head.
The evidence establishes that in addition to the 17 or
18 head in Gr.ay's feed lot 7 were sold at Delta, 186 remained
in Nevada, 74 were in Sage Valley, 200 were at Mosida.
That accounts for 484 or 485 head of cattle purchased by
Stevens prior to March 15, 1937; where were the. other 41
head?
An examination of the cattle fed and pastured by Gray
subsequent to the first day of May, 1937, will disclose that
1370 head of cattle was all that he had possession of and
all that were sold by him or in the sale of which he participated

Stevens admits that he wintered partnership cattle;
he testified that he had no partnership cattle at his place
in the spring of 1938. It is established beyond any question that he never wintered any Grantsville cattle.
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POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT S1,000.00 FOR THlE USE OF DEFENDANT'S
PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE IN TRANSACTING PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.
At page____..S'---_of our brief we discussed the defendant's use of his personal automobile in connection with the
business. Defendant claimed in Par. 12 of his amended
counterclaim the sum of $1,000.00 for the use of his personal automobile (R. 48). Plaintiff in Par. 9a of his answer
to amended counterclaim (R. 62) admitted that defendant
used his automobile for the partnership business; admitted
the value per mile to be 5c; claimed that his automobile was
not used in excess of 7500 miles and admitted· that defendant was entitled to not more than $375.00.
The Court, however, made no allowance to defendant
for the use of his automobile.
The credits which the Court
\
allowed defendant are set out in Par. 5 of the Findings of
Fact (R. 80-81). The items of expense allowed by the Court
are set out in Par. 5 (d) (e) (f) and (g) covering Par. 8a,
8b, 8c, and Par. 11 of defendant's amended counterclaim.
Defendant testified to the extensive use of his automobile; that no automobile other than defendant's was used
in connection with partnership business. In addition to the
traveling admitted by plaintiff on 'pages 21 and 22 of his
brief, the evidence discloses that many trips were made by
defendant from Payson to Salt Lake City and Ogden; that
many trips were made to Sage Valley; that trips were made
to Richfield, Minersville, Heber City, Fairfield, Nephi, Delta,
Fillmore, Milford and Spanish Fork.
The two banks used by the partners for depositing part- ,
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nership funds, as well as their personal accounts, were located in Spanish Fork. In fact, reading the testimony of
the defendant (Tr. 132-148) will show the extent to which
defendant used his automobile. Plaintiff impliedly admitted
at P. 22 of his brief that the automobile was used not less
than 15,000 miles; it is there stated: "The evidence will not
support a finding that defendant drove his automobile on
partnership business to exceed 15,000 miles." Two witnesses testified as to the reasonable charge for operating
the automobile. Defendant's witness LeGrand F. Smith
testified that the cost of operating an automobile, at the
time, was 7c per mile (Tr. 454). Plaintiff's witness Paul
D. Vincent placed the cost at 5c per mile (Tr. 555); the
Court made no award whatever.
· Counsel for appellant assumed in his brief that the
Court had made an award for the use of defendant's automobile. At P. 22 oi his brief counsel made the following
statement:
"We do not know what the Trial Court found as
to mileage or cost per mile, but if he found the cost of
operating an automobile was 7c per mile, such finding
would find support in the evidence."
If defendant used his car for the business of the partnership 15,000 miles at the cost of 7c per mile, the amount
which the plaintiff impliedly admits defendant is entitled
to would be $1,050.00; defendant, however, claims only
$1,000.00

"

We submit that the pleadings and the testimony warrant an allowance in fiavor of defendant for the use of his
personal automobile for partnership business in the amount
of $1,000.00, and there is no substantial evidence justify-
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ing a finding of any amount less than the amount claimed
by defendant.
POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT $1,701.23 BEING THE AMOUNT PAID BY
DEFENDANT AS INTEREST IN EXCESS OF THE
AMOUNT OF INTEREST PAID BY PLAINTIFF.
As observed by counsel for appellant at P. 57 of his
brief, it was stipulated at the opening of the trial that the
Court in reaching a final conclusion as to the obligation of
one partner to the other should take into ·consideration advances by each partner, and that interest at the rate of 6%
per annum should be charged on all advances for the benefit of the partnersip until same was repaid (Tr. 5-7).

It has already been called to the Court's attention that
plaintiff between the 12th of Nov., 1936, and the 15th of
March, 1937, expended for the purchases of cattle a total
of $26,303.47 (R. 31)
An examination of Par. 6 of plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 31) discloses that plaintiff between the 12th of
Nov., 1936, and the 28th day of December, 1936, expended
for the partnership the sum of $1,552.87. That on March
31, 1937, plaintiff expended the sum of $500.00. That between Sept. 17, 1937, and Dec. 16, 1937, he·expended $2,377.00; and that between Jan. 7, 1938, and April 11, 1938,
plaintiff expended for the partnership $4,048.00. The above
items are the principal items of expenses set out in said
paragraph.
It further appear, as stated in Point 5 of our brief, that
plaintiff paid $3,300.00 on a partnership note March 18,
1941.
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It will be observed that plaintiff by his pleadings
claimed that his total expenditures on behalf of the partnership were $38,091.07 (R. 63). That on April 7, 1937, defendant deposited to plaintiff's credit the sum of $10,520.70.
On March 22, 1938, plaintiff reimbursed himself from the
sale of- 405 head of cattle the sum of $18,349.47 (R. 5 and
R. 63).
It therefore becomes apparent that the amount of in-

terest to which plaintiff is entitled is interest on $10,520.75
to April 7, 1937, or interest in the approximate amount of
$190.00 plus interest on further sums as plaintiff advanced
until repaid.
It is apparent from the pleadings that the defendant's
expenditures for and on behalf of the partnership far exceeded the expenditures by plaintiff. We call the Court's
attention to the fact that there is no dispute as to the
amount expended by both partners for the purchase of
cattle. An examination of Par. 5 of defendant's amended
counterclaim shows the purchases made by defendant, the
date of purchase, from whom purchased and the amount
expended (R. 40). Defendant expended for the purchase
of cattle the sum of $8,868.77 between March 27, 1937, and
May 7, 1937. On Aug. 10, 1937, he spent $1,940.00; on Sept.
23, 1937, defendant spent $2,767.47; on Oct. 26 and 30, 1937,
defendant spent $10,940.43 for the purchase of partnership
cattle.
It will therefore appear that up to Oct. 30, 1937, defendant had ex;pended $24,316.67 or about $4,000.00 less
than plaintiff had expended for the purchase of cattle.
It will further appear from said Paragraph (R.40) that
on April 19 1938, defendant spent $18,531.71 for the purchase of cattle for the partnership. On Dec. 15, 1938, he
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spent 8:2.195.28. and on Jan. 11, 1939, he spent $2,000.00.
It therefore becomes apparent that the amount of interest

to which plaintiff would be entitled in connection with the
purchase of cattle would be far less than the amount to
which defendant would be entitled.
It further appears from Par. 8 of defendant's amended
counterclaim (R. 42-44) that defendant expended for the
partnership including the care of the cattle in Baker, Nevada, the sum of $9,199.84.
An examination of Par. 11 of defendant's amended
counterclaim discloses that defendant likewise expended for
feed, pasture, labor and other items set out therein the total sum of $38,367.15.
We call attention to Par. 6 of defendant's amended
counterclaim, which shows total sales of cattle, proceeds,
and how applied (R. 41).
It appears therefrom that defendant, up to March 15,
1937, received $356.41 (Tr. 141); and on Aug. 19 and Oct.
1, 1937, the further sum of $18,833.11. It therefore appears that during the year 1937 defendant had spent for
cattle $24,316.67, and plaintiff had spent during the fall of
1936 and 1937, $26,303.47; during said time defendant had
deposited to plaintiff's personal account $10,520.70. On
March 22, 1938, plaintiff received from sales $18,349.47
(R. 63) and up to that date defendant had expended the
amount set out in Par. 8 and Par. 11 of defendant's amended counterclaim (R. 42, 43 and 47), in excess of $23,000.00,
and by April 19, 1938, defendant had expended for cattle
the additional sum of $18,531.17 (R. 40), and had incurred
the additional expenses for the partnership as alleged in
Par. 11 of defendant's amended counterclaim in excess of
$14,400.00 (R. 47).
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We submit that Par. 13 and Par. 14 (R. 50) sets out
the interest to which each partner is entitled and properly
reflects the interest computed on the amount expended by
each partner until repayn1ent to said partner. That plaintiff is entitled to credit in the amount of $1,653.31 and Gray
is entitled to the following items of interest: $647.08, $465.10,
and $2,242.36, or a total of $3,354.54, and that the amount
of interest to which defendant is entitled in the sum of
$1,701.23.
POINT ,TEN
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT THE SUM OF $1,542.56, THE REASONABLE
VALUE OF TIDRTY-ONE HEAD OF MINERSVILLE
CATTLE PURCHASED BY PLAINTIFF FOR THE PARTNERSHIP IN 1936, AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR BY
PLAINTIFF.
Under Point 7 we discussed plaintiff's claim that defendant should be charged with at least 31 head of cattle
not accounted for. We deem it unnecessary to again discuss
this point other than to call attention to our Point 7 and
observe that if any cattle were ·unaccounted for it was the
cattle wintered by plaintiff in 1936 and 1937. We there
pointed out that plaintiff claimed that he wintered cattle,
we admit that he wintered cattle. Plaintiff claimed he wintered Grantsville cattle, the record discloses that he wintered no Grantsville cattle. If either partner is to be charged
with cattle unaccounted for it is plaintiff, on account of the
cattle he wintered in 1936 and 1937 arid failed to account
for.
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CONCLUSION

We believe that the Court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence, and by the preponderance of the
evidence, and that the only error made by the Court was
in failing to allow defendant the full amount to which he
was entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. W. WORTHEN,
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
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